Howard Richards
Professor, Earlham College, Peace and Global Justice Studies

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Dilemmas of Social Democracies

                                                                                   

Chapter 15

 

 

Social Democracy on a World Scale:

The World Bank and The Logic Of Love

 

 

Why De-Alienation is a Solution to the Problem of Poverty

            It is not obviously true that de-alienation, as we have adapted the concept, names practices that would solve the problems of poverty.  Yet it is true.  The reasons why it is not obvious do not stem from lack of empirical data.  The factual premise needed to prove that de-alienation would end poverty is, although not well known, in plain sight for all to see and not in doubt.  The lack of obviousness of the conclusion is due to the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the concept.  Once the concept is understood, it becomes obvious that if it were put into practice there would be no poverty.

            The factual premise is that there is no natural obstacle to eliminating poverty.  Many of the relevant facts are documented in Food First by Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins, which demonstrates that there would be no hunger if there were democratic control of resources (1977).  Other relevant facts are documented in Food Resources, Conventional and Novel by N.W. Pirie (1969), a biochemist at Rothamstead Laboratories in England, who shows that as a matter of biochemistry, the problem of transforming the earth's resources into adequate nutrition for all is easily solved.  R. Buckminster Fuller summed up the matter when he wrote, "We now know scientifically that for the first time in history there can be enough to support continually all of expanding humanity at previously undreamed-of and ever-advancing standards of living and intellectual satisfaction in effective participation in the evolutionary processes” (1969: 151).[1]

            Alienation means separation.  De-alienation means unity.  If people were de-alienated, they would work together in unity.  Since there is no natural obstacle to eliminating poverty, it follows that if people worked together in unity to eliminate it, it would be eliminated.  Thus the proposition that de-alienation would end poverty is very nearly a tautology.   The proposition does not say, however, how to persuade and guide people to work together in unity.  It opens a space for two crucial questions which it asks but leaves unanswered: 1) where are people going to get the motivation to do the things that must be done to meet other people's needs, and thus to eliminate poverty?  And 2) assuming that they are motivated, how are people going to be guided so that they will know what to do to meet other people's needs? 

            Nevertheless, the near-tautology that de-alienation would end poverty is significant, because it throws into relief the fact that if people would and could work together to end poverty, it would end.  It makes it clear that when and if answers to the two questions stated above are found and implemented, there will be no poverty. 

            Conceptualizing the problem of poverty in this way makes it easy to see two further points, which may be loosely termed corollaries: 

 

Corollary 1. Expecting people to be motivated to act to meet other people's needs by a desire for economic gain or profit is only a partial answer to the problem of motivation, not the whole answer. 

 

Corollary 2. Expecting the price-signals generated by supply and demand in markets to tell people how to act to meet other people's needs is only a partial answer to the problem of guidance, not the whole answer.

 

            Conceptualizing the problem in this way, and noticing that markets and market-like institutions are prominent among economic arrangements worldwide, also makes it easy to see what can be called a "corollary" of the "corollaries," which has been corroborated many times by bitter experience:

 

Corollary 3. To the extent that a society depends for meeting people's needs on profit motives and price-signals, measures designed to alleviate poverty, which weaken profit motives and/or distort price-signals, are likely to backfire.

 

Thus the proposition that de-alienation will end poverty, although it relies on confidence in findings of the natural sciences for its optimism, is not so much a prescription for ending poverty as a frame of reference for thinking about what would be required to end poverty.

            Similar points can be made about other concepts we have proposed or discussed as frameworks for thinking about how to end poverty: Adam Smith's concept of value-in-use, cultural resources, stewardship, trusteeship, volunteering, putting back into nature what you take out, local self-reliance, society producing for itself, Islamic social principles, Buddhist ideas of community and of right livelihood, and others. 

 

The Logic of Love as Another Framework for Thinking about Poverty

 

            In this chapter we are going to work with yet another concept, which is also a near tautology.  It is also true by definition once some factual premises that are not in doubt are acknowledged.  It can also be accepted or rejected as a useful way to think about how to eliminate poverty.  By introducing now in this last chapter still another concept of social democracy, i.e. social democracy as a logic of love, we do not want to be understood as dropping one subject and taking up another.  Rather we are continuing to practice the philosophical strategy that we endeavored to demonstrate in Chapter One, and to articulate in Chapter Two.

            Our shifting from one concept to another and our reliance upon diverse traditions is not simply an assertion that everybody is right and nobody is wrong.  Rather, our catholicity and conceptual flexibility pursue a vision of human language and thought in which questions about who is right and who is wrong fade into the background.  Judging logic, which Aristotle defined as sets of rules for the conduct of arguments, according to its own rules, is comparatively unimportant, compared to the more important task of judging logic according to whether it functions (or fails to function) to facilitate the delivery of the goods: the food, the clothing, the housing, the health, the happiness.

            Viewed in the manner we recommend, social democracy does not require any single ideology.  At any given time and place, it requires some ideology, because people have to share a code to communicate, and people have to communicate to cooperate.  But it does not depend for its success on universal agreement.  On the contrary: it depends for its success on the celebration of diversity.[2]

            When we introduce still another way of talking about the limitations of economics and the construction of social democracy, it is not because we have changed our minds, now dropping the idea of de-alienation and taking up instead the idea of the logic of love.  It is because we continue to believe that there are any number of different sets of conventional cultural norms, and any number of patterns-of-talk, which can function to facilitate cooperation to meet needs.  Unfortunately, there are also any number of character flaws, and any number of conceptual errors, that function to frustrate cooperation and sharing.

            To begin our discussion of the World Bank and the logic of love, we repeat an assessment made in the previous chapter: "Poverty, and therefore violence, are just not going to go away until the contradictions of commodity exchange as a way of life are successfully resolved."[3]  Commodity exchange as a way of life can be called non-love as a way of life.  This is because the extant institution of commodity exchange perpetuates the structural contradictions that make the elimination of poverty on a world scale an impossible task until those contradictions are resolved (even though it is possible to eliminate poverty locally in open economies that benefit from favorable terms of trade with the rest of the world, such as Holland and Singapore).             

      The basic rules of the game of modern society can be called rules of non-love.  Rules for deals.  The logic of exchange.  The worker says to the employer, "I will work for you, but only if you pay me."   The employer says to the worker, "I will pay you, but only if you work."   The property owner says to the tenant, "I will share my property, but only if I am paid."  The customer says to the merchant, "I will give you money, but only if you give me what I want to buy."  The merchant says to the customer, "I will give you what you need, your daily bread, your prescription medicine, or whatever it may be, but only if you pay my price."   The investor says, "I want the maximum return on my investment consistent with safety.  If the needs of others are met by my investment, that is okay, but my purpose is to make money, not to meet needs."  Thus accumulation of profit becomes the motor that moves society, and when that motor falters, society falters.

             The rules of the logic of exchange are so basic, so much a part of modern common sense, that it is assumed that they reflect human nature, the way humans are and always will be.  Economics, for its part, building a social science from the material offered by the institutions it observes, takes pride in distinguishing itself from the pre-economic notions, like the "just price" of St. Thomas Aquinas, in terms of which traditional societies understood themselves.   It has been the pride of economics that, like God, it accepts people just as they are, just as it observes them to be in the societies it studies.  Unlike God, it does not try to change them.  Adam Smith's friend David Hume held that any plan for the reform of society that relied on the improvement of manners and morals was wholly imaginary.  Smith agreed with Hume, and the economists following him have dedicated themselves to squaring the circle: manipulating the rules of non-love to maximize welfare.

            The logic of love is more comprehensive.  In its basic form it is simpler than the logic of exchange.  Early cultures discovered it long before economics was invented.  The logic of love says that we ought to act to meet another person's needs because of what the other person needs, not because of what we ourselves will get out of the deal.  Given, however, that exchange may actually work to everyone's benefit, we can think of exchange itself as a sort of friendly game we play with each other, in which, at least some of the time, everybody wins.  Competition thus might be love in disguise.  It might be what Hegel called a "ruse of reason" in which what appears to be action from self-interest turns out, in general and in the long run, to be a practical form of love.

              A moment's reflection will show that Gandhi was quite correct to maintain that without the logic of love, which he called "the law of love," the human species would have perished long ago (Gandhi, 1990: 78-9, 91).  The logic of non-love works, to the extent that it works at all, only in the middle years of life.  The very young and the very old are smelly and unproductive.  They are non-starters in games played according to the logic of commodity exchange.  They do not produce anything of value to sell in a market.  If they are going to have their needs met at all, it will be because they are loved unconditionally.  (It is true that in modern society, by the legal fiction of property ownership, there are times when we say that a very old person, even one bed-ridden and demented, is "paying" for board and care, out of earnings from prior years deposited in a bank.  This is a fiction because all they have to offer today in exchange for their care is money saved from work they did in the past, which is theirs because the law says it is theirs.  Since they produce nothing now, they could confer a net benefit on the rest of the world by dying and letting someone else inherit their savings.  In any case, whatever one thinks of the legal fiction of property ownership, the majority of very old persons exhaust their savings before they die, and rely for their care during their last years on inter-generational solidarity.)  

            A further moment's reflection will show that even in the middle years of life there is no necessary reason to suppose that a person's needs will be met by the logic of exchange.  There is no necessary reason to suppose that each person in society will have something to sell, some marketable skill or valuable service to provide.  There is no necessary reason to suppose that each person in society is in a position to earn enough to be able to strike deals to obtain from willing sellers her or his food, clothing, shelter, and other necessities.  Thus the very basic rules that constitute society produce what Viviane Forrester (1996) has aptly called "the economic horror.”  The horror of economics is that everybody is presumed capable of earning enough on the open market to get by, but it is not true. Those who do not earn enough to get by are told that it is their own fault.  As homo economicus they fail, and where being human is defined in terms of homo economicus they fail as humans.  And Forrester's examples are drawn mainly from France --a country in the first world, the developed world.  She does not even consider the greater economic horrors found in the third world.

            Although ancient peoples knew many horrors, the horror of being rejected by the labor market as an unsalable commodity is a modern invention.  Nobody doubts, nonetheless, that the modern world is on the whole better.  What some people doubt is whether it can be improved to eliminate its principal horrors, or whether its basic structure makes its horrors insuperable.  Rephrased, the question is whether capitalism is tough love, or not love at all.  One alternative, which we will call the Tough Love Worldview, conceives of today’s global capitalist economy as the current phase in humanity’s ethical construction of its social reality.  It regards capitalism as a servant of a transcendent ideal. Its logic, the logic of exchange, can in principle be held accountable to, and transformed by, a standard higher than itself.  The rules of non-love can be thought of as practical concessions to human nature, whose great merit is that some of the time they produce indirectly what love would have produced directly.  The other alternative we will call the Immutable Framework Worldview: capitalism is not love at all.  This view holds that the nations of the world whose attempts to create social democracy within their borders have been frustrated by the requirements of the global marketplace have encountered an insuperable obstacle, a global quasi-physical reality that neither should nor can be transformed.  The logic of exchange rules humanity, and not vice-versa; it is just what it is, by natural right, objective fact, cruel fate.

            Our argument will be that the history of the World Bank supports reasons for choosing the first of these two alternatives.  With all due respect for those who advocate framing the problem in a different way, and with sympathy for those who fear that we may just further muddy already muddy waters by analyzing multifaceted issues in a dualistic framework, we will proceed according to the heuristic hypothesis that the contrast between Tough Love and Immutable Framework is illuminating and useful.

 

The Birth of a Moral Orphan: the World Bank

           

            The World Bank, together with its sibling, the International Monetary Fund, was born at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the second week of July of 1944.  It was born an orphan; its natural parents, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the British Exchequer, abandoned it immediately, insisting that from the moment of its birth it be autonomous.  The closest thing it had to a moral compass was Article III, section 4 (vii) of its founding charter as stated in its Articles of Agreement, which provided, "Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in special circumstances, be for specific projects of reconstruction or development."   Although "World Bank" is its commonly used nickname, the official name given to it at Bretton Woods was  "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development."  Much turned on the word "development," especially since the other alternative, "reconstruction" ceased to be pursued a few years after World War II was over.  For what purpose there was supposed to be "development" was not stated or known.  The World Bank was born with no religion, no cosmology, no philosophy, and no democratic process for validating its rules and actions by the consent of the world's peoples.

            Its early years were dominated by a single imperative: to gain the confidence of Wall Street's institutional investors.  (Wealthy private individuals have never been a significant source of funds for the World Bank.)  To do anything, the Bank needed to raise capital, and right after World War II there was only one significant capital market in the world, the United States capital market.  The people in that market to whom the Bank had to sell itself were directors of life insurance companies, directors of mutual savings banks, trustees of large charities, trust companies, trustees of educational institutions, and the state legislators in the several states who determined which securities were eligible for purchase by managers holdings funds in a fiduciary capacity.  Most of them had been stung before.  In the 1920s Americans had bought large quantities of foreign bonds, only to see many of them go into default in the 1930s.  Now, beginning in the 1940s, the World Bank was offering them a new deal that was a sweet deal: supposedly no-risk bonds, guaranteed by the capital subscriptions and the credit of the governments which had signed the Articles of Agreement of the World Bank.  Only the United States government guarantee was considered to be worth anything, and after Franklin Roosevelt's holiday on foreclosures and other populist shenanigans, even the U.S. guarantee was imperfect. 

Thus the World Bank, regardless of what it might mean to be a "development bank" with the welfare of the world's peoples somehow at heart (as distinct from just being a plain bank) believed that it had to start by gaining the confidence of American institutional investors.

            In this atmosphere, the provisions of the United Nations charter, which provided that the Bank would be a specialized agency of the United Nations responsible to the General Assembly, quickly became dead letters.  The Bank had to be an autonomous agency, above politics, above international law as expressed in the UN Charter, above democracy, above morals, above love, above God, above reason, above ecology, above sentiment, above humanitarian ideals--for the sake of one high standard at least temporarily more important than all else: to assure trustees and directors in charge of investing other people's money that the funds advanced to the Bank would be repaid, on time, and with interest.  That capitalism was immutable, that no government and especially no revolutionary or reformist third world government had any right to change it, that it was answerable to no authority higher than its own rules, was not deduced from philosophy or theology.  The Immutable Framework Worldview appeared at the time to be an obligatory ideology, imposed by facts, since it appeared that if the Bank could not gain the confidence of investors, it could not do anything else.

 

Clinging to the Idea of “Development” for Lack of a Moral Compass

 

          The period dominated by establishing the credibility of the Bank as a borrower coincided roughly with the period when the Bank made reconstruction loans to Western Europe.  Thereafter, in the early 1950s, the Bank began what would prove to be its main activity: making development loans in the impoverished nations of the third world.  Humanitarians in and around the Bank clung to the word "development" because it was the only major value-laden word that suggested normative standards, including some sort of concern with meeting the needs of people.  The alternatives to "development" were value-laden words like "sound," "competent," and "creditworthy" that suggested approving only low-risk loan applications, and then efficiently collecting principal and interest payments, with no goal more heroic than milking the third world to produce a steady flow of unearned income to bondholders.  Similarly, humanitarians often clung to the twin disciplines of competitive markets and technical rate-of-return calculations because the alternatives were corruption, sloth, and nepotism.  Any port in a storm.

            In spite of the role that the idea of "being a development bank" played in keeping alive the idea that the Bank had some sort of mission to alleviate the plight of the world's poor in some way, the idea of "development," especially as the Bank interpreted it in its early years, was an inherently dysfunctional concept.  The Colombian scholar Arturo Escobar (1995), in his book Encountering Development, has admirably charted the rise of development ideology after World War II under the aegis of agencies like the World Bank.  His excellent account is enriched by his own experience as a participant in dysfunctional efforts to "develop" Colombia.  Without presuming to add anything to Escobar's account, we will make three brief points about what is wrong with the very idea of "development." 

            First, with respect to the role of "development" as a concept organizing the space of the world, "development" divides the globe geographically into two parts: the "developed" countries, and the others, which are classified as "underdeveloped" or "developing."  This way of organizing space overlooks and obscures the more important division of humanity between the rich, whose needs are met, and the poor, whose needs are not met.  Rich and poor are found in every country.

            Second, with respect to the role of "development" as a concept organizing time, the very idea postulates that the "developing" countries are moving from a past in which human needs were not met, toward a developed future in which human needs will be met.[4]  The images of a "developed" society that typify the end goal to which "development" is supposed to lead have been drawn mainly from the social democracies.  As we have shown in detail in the four chapters on Sweden, however, although it is possible under exceptional circumstances to pay for a welfare state with revenues derived from export-led growth, it is not possible for all countries simultaneously to be "developed," in this sense (i.e., the sense in which Sweden and others typify "development").  The constitutive rules of capitalism imply that the future promised to "developing" countries by the concept of "development" is a utopia that will never come.

            Third, with respect to the role of "development" as a concept identifying the causes and dynamic forces which have led to the relative prosperity of the first world, and which supposedly could, in principle, lead to a similar prosperity of the third world, World Bank ideas of "development" center on the Bank's role in contributing to meeting the "capital needs" of developing countries.   The Bank "finances" development, as one might "finance" a business to enable it to invest and thereafter to turn the investment into a profitable enterprise.  Development is conceived as economic growth, which means capital accumulation--not to be sure, simply as accumulating money, but as accumulating physically usable capital goods.  This view of historical causality overlooks and obscures the fact that insofar as the working classes of the social democracies achieved high wages, health benefits, pensions, and safe working conditions, their success was not caused by unfettered capital accumulation, but by a prolonged struggle by the democratic elements of society to win a larger share of the social product for the people.  The very idea of "development" as the World Bank has employed the term, connotes a kind of capital accumulation in the third world that organized labor did not let capital get away with in the first world.[5]

            The inherently dysfunctional categories for thought provided by mainstream ideas of "development" have led humanitarians to improve the concept by advocating revisions such as integrated development, balanced development, integral development, constructive development, and sustainable development.[6]  Others, such as the Peruvian theologian Gustavo Gutierrez (1973), have argued that people of good will should not speak of "development" at all but instead of "liberation.”  We are introducing into these terminological debates another way to distinguish a better from a worse category of thought, which is to contrast a narrow logic of exchange with a broad logic of love.  The narrow worldview we are calling Immutable Framework, and the broad worldview Tough Love.

            We are proposing as an alternative to the categories derived from the logic of exchange and accumulation that are embedded in mainstream ideas of "development," categories derived from what Gandhi called “the law of love.”   We will suggest that over time, and in the light of experience, the World Bank, and the international community generally, have been moving toward a love ethic.  Our proposal draws on an idea expressed by Martin Luther King Jr. in his doctoral dissertation: Justice has no ontological reality independent of love.  “Justice is dependent on love.  It is a part of love’s activity” (1955: 147).[7]  It is not that there are no rules of justice--for example, the rule so important to the logic of exchange and so important to the Bank that debts ought to be paid--but that those rules are meant to serve a higher purpose.  We are supporting the idea of caritas as the general form of the virtues that should guide life that was systematically developed by St. Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages.[8]

              But before developing further the idea of the logic of love as an alternative to, or more comprehensive form of, the idea of development, it is necessary to say a few words about the ambiguous status of humanitarian ideals in the early history of the Bank.  We have analyzed the Bank's idea of "development" as dysfunctional in the light of the presumed purpose of eliminating poverty, but it is by no means clear that the Bank in its early days had any such purpose.

            The early memoranda by Harry Dexter White, the United States Treasury Department official whose proposals eventually took the form of the Articles of Agreement that chartered the World Bank, do not say anything about great humanitarian ideals.  The problem as White saw it was that normal commerce had been disrupted by World War II, and even before World War II normal commerce had been disrupted by defaults and nationalizations that made investors in the rich countries unwilling to risk their capital in the poor countries.  White's proposal for a World Bank was a scheme for shoring up capitalist normality (Mason and Asher 1973: 13-16, 20-21).[9]   John Maynard Keynes, who chaired the committee at Bretton Woods that prepared and presented the final draft of the Articles of Agreement, stated that a principal function of the Bank would be to develop the productive capacities of the world (Mason and Asher 1973: 1-2).  He may have intended to imply that increased productive capacity would in itself relieve the suffering of the poor, in which case what he intended to imply was false.  Or he may have had in mind that parallel to the Bank's work in financing the increase of productive capacity there would be the sort of Keynesian macromanaging of the economy that would feature raising wages to create more aggregate demand for industry's products.[10]  It is true that the speech of U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau at Bretton Woods spoke in glowing terms of the benefits to humanity to be expected from the IMF and World Bank (Dormael 1978: 172-73), but it remained unclear whether this meant that eliminating poverty was to be in itself an explicit goal of the Bank’s operations, or simply a consequence attributed by mainstream economic theory to the normal processes of capital accumulation.

            In the early years of the World Bank (until Robert McNamara's speech as its president in Nairobi in 1973), it remained ambiguous whether contributing to ending poverty was the Bank's goal, and whether it would measure its success by what it did to end poverty.  During thirteen of its early years the Bank's President was Eugene Black.  He was credited with having done more than anyone else to make the Bank credible as an issuer of bonds on Wall Street--where he

himself had worked for Chase Bank before he moved from New York to Washington to join the World Bank.  Black said that the Bank was setting out to prove to the world that private enterprise works (Mason and Asher 1973: 62).  Perhaps he meant that the once-profitable business of private investment in the third world could be revived with the help of World Bank loans guaranteed by the commitments of first world governments to make their taxpayers cover any defaults.  But perhaps he meant instead, or also, that private enterprise would solve the problems of the poor by creating general abundance in which the poor would share.

 

Another Approach: the Logic of Love as a Real Moral Compass

 

            Suppose we wipe the slate clean, state frankly and unambiguously that eliminating poverty and meeting human needs is our goal, and forget, at least temporarily, the whole idea of "development."   One of the first things we will notice if we mingle with the impoverished masses of the world and observe their lives, is that the logic of exchange is not working for them.  They do not have enough money.  They do not have enough to sell, either as services or as goods, to get enough money.  Unable to meet their needs relying only on Adam Smith's famous "natural tendency to truck or barter," they are finding other ways to pursue happiness. 

            Some of the alternatives to the logic of commodity exchange are versions of the logic of love, and some are not.   Millions are turning to fundamentalist religions, finding that pre-modern rules for living grounded in precepts such as those of the Holy Koran work for them.  They give their lives meaning and hold together the families and clans on which they depend for mutual aid.  Millions are turning to crime, finding that what they cannot get on the free market by voluntary exchange where buyer and seller consent, they can get by involuntary exchange, enforced by violence or concealed by stealth.  Large numbers, especially in Africa, have turned to civil war as a way of life; even children arm themselves and live by plunder in the service of a warlord or political cause.  Millions more have turned to begging.  What they cannot get by offering equivalent value in return, they get by appealing to the hearts of passersby.  Millions more live on relief supplies provided by charitable organizations, while additional millions live on welfare payments provided by governments.  Millions more scavenge on the streets, picking up and using the trash that others have discarded.  Millions more are in prison, living at public expense as officially certified enemies of society--while other millions also live at public expense as their guards.  Many others in the ghettos of this world elect to detach subjective reality from objective reality.  Not being served by any of the cultural logics humans have invented to make life work, they escape into altered states of consciousness.  Some drink themselves to death, some hurl insane curses at imaginary interlocutors, some cling to a studied apathy while they wait to die.

            The evident inability of the logic of exchange and of capital accumulation to provide the motivation and guidance needed to meet the needs of the people of the world, does not imply that there is no role for the logic of exchange.  Indeed, some of the most successful movements for alleviating poverty have consisted of the imaginative use of the logic of exchange combined with a healthy dose of the logic of love.  For example, love is built into the ideology of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which has been copied more or less faithfully in many countries.  The Grameen Bank loans small sums to five-member groups of poor people to empower them to make a living.  Muhammad Yunus, the founder of Grameen Bank, describes as follows part of the pre-loan training given to borrowers: 

We repeat the following advice many times to them so that they will remember it when the occasion arises: “Please never get angry with the person who cannot pay the installment.  Please don't put pressure on her to make her pay.  Be a good friend, don't turn into an enemy.  As a good friend, your first response should be, `Oh, my God, she is in trouble, we must go and help her out.'”  We advise them,  "First find out the story behind the non-repayment.  From our experience we can tell you that most often there is a sad story behind each case of non-repayment.  When you get the full story, you'll find out how stupid it would have been to twist her arm to get the money.  She can't pay because her husband ran away with the money.  As a good friend your responsibility will be to go and find her husband and bring him back, hopefully, with the money.   It may also happen that your friend could not pay the installments because the cow that she bought with the loan money died.  As good friends, you should promptly stand by her side, give her consolation and courage at this disaster.  She is totally shaken by the shock of the event.  You should cheer her up and help her to pull herself together.  Ask Grameen to give her another loan, and reschedule and convert the previous loan into a long-term loan”(1994: xii).

 

            Starting with the principle that meeting needs is the goal, one can propose a logic of love as a viewpoint including, but more comprehensive than, the early World Bank's concept of "development."  Three basic tenets of a logic of love are the following:

 

Tenet 1. With respect to organizing the space of the world, it is useful to think of the world as divided into "ghettos" and "suburbs."   By "ghetto" we do not mean a racially or ethnically segregated area, but a place where poor people live, such as the inner city of an American metropolis.  The ghetto can be thought of as a place where there is no major investment.   It is a low-profit high-risk area, and therefore not attractive to investors.[11]   Consequently the people there must live in some way other than by earning money through a job created by an investor--by government subsidy, by crime, or in some other way.  In this sense, most of Africa, most of the Middle East, most of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, much of Asia, much of Latin America, as well as the inner cities of the United States are ghettos.

 

Tenet 2.  With respect to periodization, the way we conceptually organize time, history might be divided into three periods: a pre-economic past, prior to the time when humanity learned to benefit from the worldwide specialization of labor and the coordination of the self-interested activities of millions of people through markets; an economic present; and a post-economic future in which humanity does not forget what it learned from economics but at the same time learns to broaden the scope and variety of motivational and guidance systems used to mobilize resources to meet needs.

 

Tenet 3. With respect to the dynamic principles of cause and effect that operate in the world, the emphasis should be on the logics, the conventional norms guiding practice, that govern institutions.  Cultural structures are causes.  People have souls; they deliberate; they accompany and sometimes guide their acting with thinking.  For homo sapiens sapiens practice and discourse are inseparable.  Humans follow, and sometimes violate, or renegotiate, social rules.

 

            If we define the problem as how to meet people’s needs, it is evident that the logic of exchange, a discourse and a set of social rules which guides many practices today, solves only part of the problem.  It does not adequately motivate people and guide people so that needs are met without damage to the environment.  Therefore, the dynamic problem to be solved can be thought of as: 1) how to improve the functioning of the logic of exchange, so that it works to meet the needs of more people; and 2) how to limit and complement the logic of exchange with other desirable logics.

 

The History of the World Bank Interpreted as a Series of Stages of Moral Progress

 

            By and large and in the main, as stated above, the World Bank has been guided by an ideal of "development" conceived as "economic growth."  It has evaluated the "performance" of borrowing countries by indicators of growth.  As a history of the Bank published by the Brookings Institution states: 

The development indicators commonly taken into account in Bank analysis include various measures of (a) the rate of growth of national and per capita income, (b) rates of growth of factor inputs, particularly domestic savings rates and public sector savings rates, (c) rates of growth of output and investment in various sectors, (d) putative measures of efficiency of resource use, such as sectoral and aggregate capital-output ratios, and (e) various measures of external viability" (Mason and Asher 1973: 443).[12]

 

Nevertheless, the history of the Bank’s development loans has been the history of a learning process.  The progress of the Bank’s learning has been in the direction of a logic of love, although sometimes it has taken one step forward and two steps back.  That history can be summarized as eleven somewhat overlapping stages.

 

Stage One: The Early Port, Railway, and Electric Power Loans

 

            The constitutive rules of modern society provide that sales are consensual transactions between buyers and sellers.  They provide that owners may and may not choose to let others use their property, and owners may and may not dedicate their property to productive purposes.   Owners of money may and may not decide to invest it, and if they do invest, it is up to them to decide where.  There is no reason to suppose that in general there will be enough investment to create enough jobs to pay the entire worldwide working class adequate wages.  Hence there is no reason to suppose that the world’s poor will thus be enabled to engage in sales transactions in which willing sellers will sell them the food, clothing, housing, and medical care they need.

            Although President Black wanted the World Bank to prove that private enterprise works, its very existence was proof that although private enterprise might work some places some of the time, it does not work in all places all of the time.  The poor areas of the world, the areas Bank ideology calls “developing,” and which our ideology calls “ghettos,” are low-profit high-risk areas for investors.  The probability that investment funds will spontaneously flow into them in sufficient quantity to employ all willing workers at wages sufficient to meet their basic needs is zero.  The reason why a government-sponsored international development bank was proposed in the first place was that private investors did not want to invest in the third world.

            The Bank’s initial responses to third world reality conceived of private investment as normal, and its own activity as a government-sponsored facilitator of investment as abnormal.  It was in the anomalous position of being a public agency that (at first) only made loans to governments, which, nevertheless, endorsed an ideology strongly supportive of private enterprise.  The Bank looked for ways to help governments prime the pump for, or, to vary the metaphor, to jump-start, the flow of private capital.  Some thought of the World Bank as a transitory institution, which would shut up shop and dissolve itself when the world became normal, as was expected to happen soon.  It was reasoned that two things were needed to jump-start private investment in the third world: infrastructure, and government policies designed to create a favorable investment climate.  The Bank as a lender started out making loans for infrastructure, for port facilities, railways, and above all for electric power generation, mostly in Mexico, Brazil, and India (Mason and Asher 1973: 160-61, 197, 233, 707, 715-16).  The bank as an adviser encouraged governments to make the “tough decisions” (i.e. low wages, low taxes, unrestricted repatriation of profits) that would attract private investors.  The roles of lender and adviser coalesced when the Bank insisted that the borrowing countries raise prices.  When persuasion proved to be ineffective, the Bank began to condition its loans on “rate covenants” requiring borrowing governments to charge higher fees for the use of port facilities, higher railway fares, and higher electric rates (Ibid., 237-29).  Since the loans were made to public utilities that were monopolies, there was nothing the citizens could do but pay the higher rates.  The hands of their own governments were tied by covenants with the force of international law.

            In order to prove that private enterprise worked the early loans were non-starters.  What the Bank proved was that low-profit high-risk investments can be turned into high-profit low-risk investments when an international quasi-governmental agency (the World Bank) sells gilt-edged bonds through Morgan Stanley and First Boston Corporation, and then uses the proceeds of bond sales to make loans at close-to-commercial rates to third world utility monopolies, whose rates are set by governments; and when the governments are required to raise the rates.  The Bank rationalized this outcome by reasoning that sound business practice required a company to charge enough for its products to acquire an adequate reserve to be sure its debts would be paid, and to be sure it could retain enough earnings to finance its own future expansion.  Of course, sound business practice, so defined, cannot be generalized.  If all firms in Mexico, Brazil, and India, had similarly raised their prices, the result would have been inflated prices with nobody better off than before.  The effect of the World Bank’s rate covenants was that certain firms, the ones the Bank lent to, were allowed and required to raise their prices, thus guaranteeing high profits for a privileged sector and no risk for the buyers of World Bank bonds. 

 

Stage Two: Expanded Lending to Carefully Selected Borrowers

 

            The Bank never admitted that a large part of the world is not a promising field for the establishment of profitable businesses.  Arturo Escobar illustrates the Bank’s dysfunctional blindness in this respect with his thorough account of the efforts of the Bank and associated agencies in Colombia, which never acknowledged the basic fact that producing food to sell to people who have no money is not profitable.  Instead of acknowledging the reality imposed by the very constitutive rules of modern society, which is that the limited number of profitable businesses investors will set up voluntarily is bound to be insufficient to produce and distribute enough to meet everybody’s needs, the Bank interpreted the problem as a lack of technical managerial skill in third world countries.  The poor countries lacked the technical skills needed to prepare loan applications to the Bank.  They did not know how to write business plans and how to project financial rates of return (Escobar 1995: 73-85).[13]  The Bank insisted that there was no lack of funds for making loans.  That part was true.  As long as it could sell government-guaranteed bonds on the bond market, and as long as it could make selective loans to carefully studied borrowers, and as long as it could require governments to allow its borrowers to charge high prices for their products, World Bank bonds would be blue chips. 

            Acting on the basis of what it believed to be true, the Bank undertook to train potential third world borrowers in the skills needed to make loan applications to itself.  Soon it found itself reviewing for approval loan applications where it had itself been involved in every phase of the application process, starting with identifying promising projects, and selecting which ones deserved priority (Escobar 1995:164-67).  Since priority was determined largely by calculating opportunity costs (i.e., by comparing how profitable the proposed investment would be compared to other uses of the same money) the Bank had no trouble equating what was good for its bondholders (i.e., being sure they would be promptly repaid with interest), with what was good for the borrowing country.  As Escobar recounts, the third world soon acquired a class of highly-paid technical experts in development, whose role was to facilitate the funding of foreign aid projects financed by the World Bank and other agencies.  Some of the most successful of them joined the headquarters staff of the World Bank in Washington (Escobar 1995: 35-39, 44-47).

            Expanded lending was accompanied by the continuation and expansion of the World Bank’s role as adviser to third world governments.   Governments were encouraged to adopt policies that would raise profits high enough to attract private investment, both their own local domestic private investment and international investment.  They were required to put in place whatever policies were called for in order to ensure that Bank-financed projects would be profitable.  The Bank was able to boast in its early years that it had selected and planned its loans so carefully that it had never suffered a default.[14]

            Given the basic cultural structures of the modern world, the expanded lending of the Bank and other agencies working along similar lines, often in tandem with the Bank, could in the course of time only lead where it did lead, namely: 1) to the rich getting richer, while the poor on the whole stagnated or got poorer; 2) to the countries of the third world assuming debt obligations which they could repay only at great human sacrifice, or not at all; and 3) to the flooding of the first world by cheap-labor goods from the newly industrialized third world, thus undermining the relatively high wage and benefit levels in the first world that had been achieved with so much pain and suffering during the previous century.

 

 

Stage Three: The Opening of the Soft Loan Window

 

            Although the United Nations had effectively been barred from any decision-making role at the World Bank, several United Nations agencies, and a number of third world countries using the UN as a forum, notably India and Chile, doggedly insisted that there had to be a serious global effort to end world poverty.  It was obvious that the World Bank’s development loans at close to commercial rates were not going to accomplish that goal.  To make a clean break with poverty, there had to be a clean break with the logic of exchange. The haves of the world had to take responsibility for sharing and cooperating with the have-nots.  A number of independent commissions, one of them headed by the philanthropist and sometime New York governor Nelson Rockefeller, came to the same conclusions.[15]

            As a cumulative result of many conscientious efforts, the World Bank opened its soft loan window in 1960.   It is called the International Development Association, but it has the same staff and same president as the Bank.  The European contributors to the soft loan fund were inclined to use the money to make grants for development, not loans.  In deference to what was believed to be the attitude of the United States Congress and the American people, however, it was decided that the new window would not give money away, but would loan it on terms so favorable that the terms would almost amount to gifts.  The soft loan window began making loans to be repaid in fifty years with no interest, with only a small service charge, and sometimes with a long moratorium period with no payments due at all.  On the basis of using a standard discount rate to calculate the present value of the stream of payments that would flow back into the Bank to repay the soft loans, the soft loans were often 80-percent to 90-percent gifts.  Unlike the Bank’s hard loans, funds to make soft loans did not come from selling bonds.  The soft loan funds have been donated by the governments of the rich countries of the world (Payer 1982: 33; Mason and Asher 1973: 222). They are gifts from first world taxpayers.

            Another source of funds for soft loans has been the World Bank itself.  Since the Bank charges higher rates of interest on its hard loans than the rates it pays to its bondholders, the Bank has been a profitable institution.  Only so much can be spent on the Bank’s own staff and on expanding its formidable research capabilities.  When Poland withdrew from membership in the World Bank, it took with it not only a withdrawal of its initial capital subscription, but also its share of the profits the Bank had earned so far.  The Bank’s Governors and staff did not want that to happen again the next time a country withdrew (Mason and Asher 1973: 120).  A much better use for the Bank’s profits, one much more consonant with its ideals, was to donate the profits from the hard loan window to the soft loan window.

            With regard to the Bank’s proud track record of never having suffered a default on a loan, the soft loan window opened just in the nick of time.  Already in 1960 India and Pakistan had borrowed more than they could possibly repay. Their hungry masses were already groaning under the burden of debt repayment.  The soft loan window quickly bailed out India and Pakistan, and thus, indirectly, bailed out the hard loan window (Mason and Asher 1973: 399-403).

            The soft loan window is an ethical milestone.  It is a recognition that giving is a normal part of human life.  It is a recognition that the needs of everyone on the planet are not going to be met solely through any practice of the logic of exchange, however sophisticated.

            As the World Bank has handled it, the soft loan window is an intelligent form of giving.  A major objection to gifts sent to the third world from the first world is that they have a “crowding out” effect.  When free food from first world donors is available, an unintended result can be that third world farmers lose customers. Food that might have been grown locally is not grown; the farmers become dispirited and dependent.  An area that might have produced its own food may become permanently dependent on free or subsidized imports.  A misguided version of the logic of love crowds out the logic of exchange.

            Intelligent giving requires achieving a “crowding in” effect.  The objective is to meet more needs, not just to meet the same needs in a different way. On the positive side of the ledger, the World Bank has been careful to use soft funds in ways that complement hard funds to produce a higher total net benefit.  On the negative side of the ledger, loan agreements, however generous, which tie third world borrowers to the tutelage of the World Bank for fifty years, are less beneficial than forms of aid that entail greater respect for the autonomy of the peoples of the third world, and greater liberty for them to seek their own tutors in the marketplace of ideas.

 

Stage Four: Funding Social Projects Without Reference to the Profit Motive

 

            When the Philippines applied to the soft loan window for funds to build roads, the World Bank turned it down.  The reason for denying the soft loan was that the Philippine economy at the time was growing fast enough to enable the Philippines to make payments on a hard loan (Mason and Asher 1973: 400).  Unlike the hard loan window, which always has more funds to lend than it has qualified loan applicants, the soft loan window has too little money to fund all the worthy projects brought to it.  Therefore, the Philippines should apply for a hard loan.

            There was a catch.  The Philippine government was not talking about toll roads.  They were proposing a project that was not going to make any money.  It was going to provide needed infrastructure for the benefit of the people, at government expense.  Up until that time, the Bank had lent money only for self-liquidating projects, for enterprises that were expected to generate the profits from which repayment of the loans would be made.  It had not made loans to be repaid from future tax revenues.

            Considering the matter carefully, in the light of its experience and its growing sense of itself as a benevolent organization, the World Bank decided that it made no sense to fund non-profit projects out of its soft loan window, and then to refuse to fund non-profit projects out of the hard loan window for countries that were too rich to meet the strict demands of the means-test used at the soft loan window.  Since the early 1960s, the Bank has made loans for social projects that do not generate any profits, including population control projects, nutrition projects, many health sector loans in cooperation with the World Health Organization, and many education loans in cooperation with UNESCO.

 

Stage Five: Legitimating the Public Sector

 

            In 1968 the World Bank passed another milestone when it decided that it would no longer refuse to make loans to support business enterprises located in the public sector.   It soon found itself making the majority of its loans to government-owned and autonomous public entities in the third world.

            The presence of the World Bank in the public sector has been a mixed blessing.  It has tended to insist that public enterprises operate for profit the same as private enterprises, thus nullifying the prospects for managing a public enterprise to make it socially responsible with respect to a gamut of objectives, among which earning a decent profit for its owner, the state, would be only one.  The Bank has also insisted that government-owned recipients of its loans have independent boards of directors, responsible to no political authority, and indeed, like the Bank itself, not effectively responsible to anyone at all.  The result has been to encourage independent economic fiefdoms.  They are clothed with public authority.  They often possess monopolies, tax exemptions, and privileged access to natural resources.  But they are not accountable to the people directly or indirectly.[16]

            Also, although the Bank has accepted public ownership as a legitimate form of ownership, it still favors private profit.  It appears to take the view that private investment for profit is the norm, to be relied on wherever possible, and that public investment is an inferior form of investment to which recourse must be had when profits are too low, or the risks too great, to attract private capital.  Thus the Bank has participated in, and has done little or nothing to discourage, partnerships of public and private capital in which public money has been used to make low-interest loans to projects whose profits go to private enterprises. The government puts up enough cheap public money to make the enterprise attractive to a private partner (see, e.g., Payer 1982: 135-56). 

 

Stage Six: Concern for the Good of the Whole

 

            In its early days the Bank’s reviews of loan applications concentrated on the financial rate of return.  The leading question was whether the borrower would make a large profit with the money borrowed.  Later the Bank added to its loan approval analysis the concept of “economic rate of return.”  The question shifted from whether the particular project to be funded would make money, to the question whether the loan would benefit the economy as a whole.[17]  The classic case in which the Bank saw a major difference between the financial rate of return and the economic rate of return was the case in which the borrower planned to make large profits in

a protected market.  Its earnings projections counted on selling its products not at world market prices, but at higher prices created by protective tariffs and import restrictions.  In such cases, the Bank reasoned, a particular proposed borrower would win, but the nation’s consumers and the nation as a whole would lose.  Therefore, the loan application should not be approved (Mason and Asher 1973: 247-54).

            Our opinion, on the contrary, is that most nations most of the time are better off choosing greater national and local self-reliance, even when it means making purchases at higher than world market prices.  Of course, our opinion does not count for much compared to the World Bank’s opinion.  We are, however, persuaded by Jürgen Habermas (1996) and others who have advanced weighty arguments in favor of democracy.[18]  They imply that the decision concerning how to handle the trade-off between the advantages of trusting one’s own resources and the advantages of purchasing less expensive goods on the world market should be made by the people of a nation, not by us, and not by the World Bank.

            The principles of democracy, that there should be government of, by, and for the people, are not arbitrary principles.  In addition to the weighty arguments in their favor, there is the weighty experience of history, which teaches that although democracies have many failings, and real democracies always have more failings than ideal democracies, the alternatives are worse. There should be open public debate on issues important to the people’s welfare, such as how much to import and how much to produce at home.  There should be transparent processes of policy formation.  We know that elites will always govern one way or another, but we are nonetheless grateful, and we believe everybody should be grateful, when elites are constrained by norms that require them to obtain the consent of the governed in some form, when they are in some way accountable to laws and to constituencies.

            The idea of “economic rate of return” is only meaningful, in the last analysis, if someone identifies what outcomes are desired.  If it is the political will of a nation that what is desired is greater local self-reliance, then an economic rate of return, properly calculated, will show that the nation gains, and does not lose, when it becomes more self-sufficient.  It is the considered judgment of many thoughtful people in the third world, and often a majority opinion, that the policies that would be in the best interests of their nation are not the policies that the World Bank thinks are in the best interests of their nation.[19]

            The general concept of considering the good of the whole nation, as distinct from considering the expected financial rate of return of a particular project, was a step forward for the Bank.  The principal application of the concept, which consisted of substituting economic theories endorsed by the Bank for the consent of the governed, was a step backward.

 

Stage Seven: The Elimination of Poverty as the Bank’s Mission

 

            In 1973 the Bank passed another ethical milestone.  World Bank President Robert McNamara declared: “We should strive to eradicate absolute poverty by the end of this century.  That means in practice the elimination of malnutrition and illiteracy, the reduction of infant mortality, and the raising of life-expectancy standards to those of the developed nations” (McNamara 1981: 259).[20]   Thus ended almost two decades of uncertainty concerning the purpose of the Bank, as the Bank itself announced the standard by which its performance should be judged.

            McNamara’s clarification of the Bank’s purpose came with an important admission.  He admitted that he personally, and the World Bank in general, did not know how to solve the problem of world poverty.  His admission implied that economic growth was not the solution to the problem of world poverty.  The World Bank had identified its mission as “development,” and it had identified development with economic growth.  If economic growth were the solution to the problem of world poverty, the World Bank would have known the solution all along.   McNamara explicitly recognized the need to redefine “development,” to make it more than just economic growth.

            Under McNamara the Bank made important commitments.  If it did not know how to end world poverty, it would use its formidable research capabilities to find out.   If economic growth was not the answer, it would find out what was the answer and pursue whatever that answer was.  If the Bank could not do it alone, it would partner with other agencies committed to the same goal.

            President Black, in 1962, had declared that the only way the Bank was able to “get away with” what it was doing was to put forward its economic calculations as “morally antiseptic,” as if economic forecasts were, like weather forecasts, predictions of natural events.[21]  His wordview was that of the Immutable Framework.  President McNamara, in contrast, in 1973 and many times afterward, spoke with the moral passion of a crusader against poverty.  In the end, nevertheless, despite his good intentions, McNamara did more damage than Black.[22]  By enormously expanding the Bank’s activities, he made poverty worse.  Brian Rich, of the Environmental Defense Fund, explains why:

Although population growth and poverty are often blamed for the growing masses of uprooted people in the developing world, in many countries economic development as it has been practiced is as much a cause of such poverty as a solution. . . .  A disproportionate number of these “development refugees,” as anthropologist Thayer Scudder calls them, come from the marginalized peoples of the earth: tribal and indigenous groups, the harijans (outcastes) in India, the landless and homeless--all those who increasingly fall outside the mainstream of the modern market economy.  Jacques Attali’s vision of a planet overrun by hordes of global nomads is no mere nightmare, but one possible outcome of the historical project of Western development (Rich 1994: 155-56). 

 

Stage Eight: The Bank as Intellectual Leader of the Finance Community

 

            Stage Eight refers not so much to a step in the evolution of prevailing thinking at the World Bank (from the logic of exchange to the logic of love), as to a step in the evolution of the influence of the World Bank, as its model of thought became the accepted model for the world finance community at large.  Starting from the early days when it undertook to train third world technical experts in how to prepare loan applications, the Bank found that it had a potent source of intellectual influence in its ability to combine seminars with top-flight economists with the concrete rewards that went with loan approval.

            It later learned that it could do more to induce thinking it regarded as sensible if it joined forces with other aid agencies.  Once a consortium of aid agencies, all of them more or less committed to mainstream capitalist economics, reached consensus on what was best for a third world nation, there was little anybody could do to stop their intellectual consensus from becoming policy.  The nation itself usually had little or no discretionary capital to invest, and was therefore inclined to make its policies conform to advice that came with money.  Private sector investors were generally unwilling to move without guarantees from governments.

There were occasional breaks in the ranks, as when the government of the Netherlands withdrew from the consortium which coordinated development policy for Indonesia, because it could no longer stomach the human rights abuses of General Suharto’s dictatorship.[23]  By and large, however, cooperation among the major players engaged in conceptualizing, funding, and guaranteeing third world development has produced the closest thing to a de facto world government the world has yet known. The de facto world government has been strengthened by clauses in treaties associated with the World Trade Organization which explicitly curtail the powers of national governments.                                                                                                         

            It was natural that the World Bank, and to a lesser extent its sister institution the International Monetary Fund, should become the intellectual leader of the international consensus of the world’s major aid and finance institutions.  It was not because the World Bank put up the lion’s share of the funds for most international projects.  Indeed, since the mid-1980s, private commercial bank loans, guaranteed but not funded by governments, have become the major source of capital flows to the third world.  The World Bank has taken the intellectual leading role because it has more information than anyone else.  Its highly profitable operations have enabled it to hire a large research staff and to produce vast quantities of high quality well documented publications.  Its practice of meticulously studying every loan application, every loan applicant, and every national economy made it the brain of the global economy.

            As the World Bank became the leading intellectual center for the study of development, it also became home to a number of diverse currents of thought within its own staff, as well as a venue where visiting lecturers, often with views at odds with the Bank’s views, came to participate in ongoing dialogues concerning development policy.  Questions about the importance of family planning to the future of Malaysia are hotly debated in the corridors of the headquarters of the World Bank at 1818 H Street in Washington, D.C.  These debates among people from diverse regions of the world would set the stage for the World Bank to reach additional ethical milestones as time went by.

           

Stage Nine: The Structural Adjustment Programs

 

            In the historic race between education and catastrophe, catastrophe pulled ahead in the 1980s, as it became apparent that the nations of the third world could not repay their loans.   As John Maynard Keynes had candidly observed in 1944, speaking at the time mostly to deaf ears, the only way to maintain most third world loans as performing loans was to roll them over at maturity into new loans.  Many nations needed continuous injections of new loans in order to stay current on payments on the old loans.  These nations were, as Cheryl Payer (1975) wrote and extensively documented, caught in a debt trap.[24]  In the early 1980s, certain triggers proximately caused first Mexico, and then other major borrowers, to threaten to stop payments not just on World Bank loans but on foreign loans in general.  The triggers were: 1) the second big OPEC raising of oil prices in 1979; and 2) the decision of the United States Federal Reserve Board to raise interest rates, which raised interest rates all over the world.  But these were only the triggers: underlying the newly manifested economic problems was the fact that Keynes had been basically correct in the first place.

            In spite of the progress World Bank thinking had made in discarding one by one the premises of the notion that the logic of exchange, if only it is intelligently administered, will function to meet the needs of the world’s people, it and the IMF were not ready to admit--and perhaps could not admit--that their basic ideology, the Immutable Framework posited by mainstream economics, was wrong.  Instead of moving forward intellectually to acknowledge that doctrinaire free market capitalism was irreconcilable with reality, the World Bank and IMF moved backward to insist ever more strenuously that the nations of the third world abide by the rules of games at which they could only lose.  Like a prairie dog who hears a vehicle coming down the road, instead of running out into the unknown for safety, they sought safety by returning to the known.  The prairie dog, racing to its hole, must cross the road and risk getting run over.  The World Bank and the IMF raced back to free market orthodoxy, which requires drastic cuts in the living standards of the poor people of the world--the very people the Bank was committed to lifting out of poverty.

            It was at this point that the World Bank, together with the IMF, became the world’s most hated institution.  As a small sample of the vast literature attacking the Bank, we will quote the following words written by Davison Budhoo, an economist from the small third world nation of Grenada, who created an international sensation when he resigned from the IMF staff in 1988 in protest against what he called “its increasingly genocidal policies.”  Budhoo writes:

 

1994  marks the fiftieth  anniversary of the founding of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. 

But as the North congratulates itself and celebrates, the South and its three billion poor will tear out their hair in rage.  For the operations of these agencies there have been catastrophic.  Instead of development and favorable adjustment, the Third World today is in an accelerating spiral of economic and social decline.  That decline is linked directly to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 

IMF-World Bank structural adjustment programs (SAPs) are designed to reduce consumption in developing countries and to redirect resources to manufacturing exports for the repayment of debt.  This has caused overproduction of primary products and a precipitous fall in their prices.  It has also led to the devastation of traditional agriculture and to the emergence of hordes of landless fa